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Introduction 
The present report is one of the products of a study commissioned by the European Commission’s 
Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO), through its unit in 
charge of rural development, food security and nutrition (C1), aimed to clarify the potential roles of 
food reserves (FR) in enhancing food and nutrition security in developing countries, and make 
recommendations on how to use food reserves (in complement to other tools), taking into account the 
specificities on the context and the constraints of World Trade Organization (WTO) disciplines. The 
study, coordinated by the CIRAD with support from DAI Europe, was conducted in the course of 2016 
based on a review of the existing literature (both theoretical and empirical), and ten case studies 
analysing national or regional experiences in Africa, Asia and South America. 
 
The theoretical and empirical knowledge on what can be expected from FR to enhance food and 
nutrition security has been summarised in the Synthesis Report of the study.1 As a complement, the 
present report captures the main lessons learnt from the each of the 10 case studies that looked at 
experiences in Asia (Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Philippines), South America (Brazil,) and 
Africa (Burkina Faso, ECOWAS Regional Reserve, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal and Zambia). The 
summaries enclosed here are based on the draft case study reports presented and discussed at the 
“Public Stocks and Food Security in Developing Countries” workshop held on 22-24 June 2016 in 
Montpellier, France. 
 
The rest of this introduction presents the impact pathways by which FR can contribute to improve food 
and nutrition security, as well as the main lessons learnt from the case studies. 
Impact pathways by which FR can improve food and nutrition security 
The definition of food and nutrition security has evolved over time, reflecting the progressive 
enlargement of the concept. The definition, adopted during the 1996 World Food Summit, states that 
“food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, 
safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy 
life”. The widely accepted interpretation of this definition enlarged it even more by considering the 
“utilisation” of the food through “adequate diet, clean water, sanitation and health care” in order to 
reach “a state of nutritional well-being where all physiological needs are met” (FAO, 2006). According 
to this interpretation, food and nutrition security encompasses four dimensions: i) food availability, ii) 
food access, iii) utilization and iv) stability of the three first dimensions. Food and nutrition insecurity 
can be chronic or transitory (World Bank, 1986). Chronic food and nutrition insecurity refers to 
households with permanent difficulties to feed themselves whereas transitory food and nutrition 
security refers to households in difficulty only when facing a crisis. Of course, households may shift 
from the category ‘food secure’ to the category ‘transitory food insecure’ or ‘chronically food insecure’ 
and vice versa. 
 
Food reserves (FR) are stocks of food products held by a public entity. The considered products 
should be food products with content in calories or nutrients that render them important for food and 
nutrition security (stocks of coffee or cacao can hardly be considered as FR). In practice, FR are 
mainly made of grain or other staples (for instance, milled cassava in some regions of the world). The 
public entity that holds the FR can be national but also local, regional2 or (theoretically) international. 
                                                     
1  All the products of the study, including this synthesis report, are available at https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/hunger-
foodsecurity-nutrition/discussions/how-can-food-reserves-best-enhance-food-and-nutrition-security-developing-countries. 
2  The Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the three East Asia nations of China, Japan and South Korea (ASEAN 
Plus Three), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) have built regional grain reserves. 
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By extension, stocks managed by village communities are sometimes assimilated to FR, as their effect 
is quite similar to the effect of local public FR (managed by municipalities or other local authorities). 
 
There are different ways to use FR to improve food and nutrition security, as illustrated in Figure 
1. FR can be used to fight against chronic food and nutrition insecurity by providing poor households 
with permanent food transfers. They can also be used to manage food crises either by providing 
emergency transfers to food insecure households, or by mitigating food price increases. Finally, FR 
procurement can be used to provide incentives to food producers, thereby contributing to long-run 
food and nutrition security. 
 
 
 
Source: Author. 
Figure 1 Potential use of FR for improving food and nutrition security 
 
The first impact pathway is controversial. Although some countries (such as Brazil and India) are 
providing permanent food transfers to food insecure households, it is more and more acknowledged 
that providing cash or voucher transfers is often a more cost-effective way to fight against chronic food 
insecurity. Moreover, when food transfers are implemented, public purchases can often be made on a 
just-in-time basis (with a limited use of FR). 
 
However, exceptions exist where providing food transfers is more cost-effective to reach specific food 
and nutrition security objectives (for instance, increasing the consumption of calories or specific 
nutrients), or to improve the food and nutrition security of particular social groups (for instance, 
persons living far from markets and groups where women manage food – but not cash – transfers and 
pay more attention than men to household food consumption). Finally, situations exist where it is 
relevant to purchase in advance and supply transfers through FR (for instance, where there are risks 
of shortages or excessive seasonality of prices). 
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The second impact pathway is highly important: food crises are often provoked or exacerbated by 
tensions on food markets (shortages or sharp prices increases). These tensions generate a collapse 
in the physical or economic access to food of many households (in particular the poorest). The 
resulting devastating effects on food and nutrition security can, to some extent, be managed by 
emergency cash transfers provided to food insecure households. However, these transfers have many 
limitations: they can hardly cover all food insecure households (because of the imperfection of 
targeting), and in a context of tensions on food markets, they are likely to exacerbate the increase in 
food prices. Actions to release these tensions are therefore necessary. In many situations, these 
actions require the use of FR.  
 
This is especially the case when food products important for national food and nutrition security can be 
imported only to a partial extent or with long or uncertain import timelines. This may be because these 
products are not traded on international markets: sources of supply from the regional market may be 
too limited or subject to disruptions (all the more so, since bad harvests are likely to occur at the same 
time in neighbouring countries, as in the Sahel in 2005 and 2012). It may be because a country’s 
imports account for a significant share of the quantity traded on international markets, or because the 
country is landlocked, or simply because there is a situation of scarcity on international markets (as 
occurred during the 2008 crisis). In these situations, shortages or sharp price increases are likely to 
occur in developing countries (and may be exacerbated by stock hoarding and panics); FR are then 
necessary to supply transfers and markets during the time necessary to import these products (or 
substitutes of these products). 
 
In practice, staples (grains, roots and tubers) play a decisive role because they not only provide the 
cheapest source of calories (and therefore the major part of the caloric intake) but also because, in 
developing countries, they often account for an important share of households’ total expenditures. 
Therefore, sharp increases in staple prices endanger not only the consumption of staples (and thereby 
caloric intake) but also the consumption of other foods (and thereby macro-nutrient and micro-nutrient 
intake); many households have to reduce the diversity of their consumption in order to maintain their 
staple consumption level. Some households may also reduce their health expenditures or their capital 
and savings (thereby becoming less resilient to future crises). Sharp increases in staple prices are 
therefore very damaging for food and nutrition security. 
 
FR are therefore necessary in periods of crisis to release tensions on food markets. FR are used to 
supply food transfers and markets (especially with staples) during import timelines and possibly during 
longer periods when the staples most consumed by the poor are not traded on international markets. 
 
The third impact pathway has also proved to be important. Green revolutions played an important 
role in improving food and nutrition security by reducing the cost of basic food products (in particular 
grains), by increasing the stability of grain production, thus diminishing the frequency and magnitude 
of food crises, and by releasing land and agricultural labour to produce other foods. These green 
revolutions were rendered possible by floor price policies that partly rested on FR procurement (for 
instance, in Bangladesh, India and Indonesia). Thanks to floor prices, farmers were more willing to 
invest, and banks or microfinance institutions were more willing to lend them money. 
 
However, it is worth noting that: 
• Stimulating investment does not require a permanent support of producer prices (which would 
be damaging for poor consumers). What matters is preventing price collapses. The floor can 
therefore be fixed at the mid-term average level of international prices or even at a slightly lower 
level. 
• Floor prices policies may generate environmental issues if they result in promoting production 
models that generate scarcities in some of the resources used (for instance, water for irrigation) 
or too high a level of pollution of soil, water and plants, generating food safety issues. Moreover, 
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their effect on rural poverty and farmer food and nutrition security is not automatic as these 
policies are likely to benefit mainly big farmers (in Zambia, for instance, farmers with less than 
one hectare of land account for two-thirds of the country’s farmers but only for 6 per cent of the 
sales to the FR agency). If the floor price is set at too high a level, floor price policies can even 
be detrimental to deficit farmers (who account for 73 per cent of small farmers in Ethiopia and 
63 per cent in Kenya). 
 
This is the reason why there is a rationale for using FR procurement to provide targeted incentives 
instead of (or in addition to) floor prices or other non-targeted incentives. These targeted incentives 
can be focused on: 
• Environmental-friendly production models that contribute to food and nutrition security both in 
the short run (by improving health through improved food safety and water quality) and in the 
medium run (by increasing the sustainability of food production, by reducing pollution of soils 
and water tables, and by conserving soil fertility and scarce resources, such as water for 
irrigation and phosphates); 
• Small-scale farmers to reduce rural poverty and improve rural food and nutrition security; 
• Specific markets tools to make markets more transparent and to make them work better for 
farmers: encouraging, for example, collective marketing through producer organisations (to 
increase farmer bargaining power and open new marketing channels), warehouse receipt 
systems (to increase farmer access to credit and thereby their ability to wait for the right 
moment to sell their products) and commodity exchanges (to reduce information asymmetries 
and render competition less imperfect). 
 
Coordinating several FR is important for stronger impacts. FR can exist at different scales (local, 
national, regional). A good ‘vertical coordination’ between these different levels of FR is a way to 
increase their impacts. Also, national FR can generate supranational impacts; by allowing countries to 
regulate their deficits by internal means, they are likely to play a stabilizing role on international or 
regional markets. Conversely, the lack of FR (and more generally of stocks) in importing countries 
may be problematic; in 2008, it resulted in panic imports that exacerbated the increases in 
international prices of rice and wheat. As national FR benefit international market stability but are built 
by national governments to serve national purposes, their levels are likely to be below the level that 
would be optimal from the point of view of global food and nutrition security. There is therefore a need 
for a supranational governance of FR to allow a good ‘horizontal coordination’ between national FR.  
Main lessons from the case studies  
The case studies provide useful insights on the way FR can be used to activate the different impact 
pathways described above. 
 
Impact pathway #1 – Lessons on how FR can be used to fight against chronic food insecurity 
In many countries, FR are used to supply permanent food transfers to poor and vulnerable households 
(often in complement to cash transfer programmes). This fact is reflected in the following case studies: 
Bangladesh, Brazil, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, where safety nets providing in-kind 
transfers exist. The impacts of these transfers are mixed, depending on the country – they are 
sometimes undermined by a poor targeting as, for instance, in Indonesia. 
The main lessons on this topic stem from Brazil, where food transfers account for a small share of all 
permanent transfers – the major part being the cash transfers provided through the Bolsa Família 
programme. However, food transfers and the national school feeding programme play an important 
role in promoting diets that meet nutritional requirements but also cultural habits and environmental 
and social criteria (local and organic food, produced by small-scale farmers). Note however that the 
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contribution of FR to these food transfers programmes is limited: as the priority is given to fresh and 
local products, they are usually not stored a long time in FR and specific modalities have even been 
designed where the products are directly delivered to the recipients by farmers or farmer 
organisations. 
 
Impact pathway #2 – Lessons on how FR can be used to manage food crises 
The case studies provide many lessons in this area. First, the Bangladesh and Senegal case studies 
illustrate the need for FR to manage food crises. The experience of these two countries is highly 
interesting because they are in the situation where the need for FR is the less obvious: their food 
security depends on a food product that is traded on the international market (rice); their needs are 
small compared to the size of the global market; and they are coastal countries. However, during the 
2008 high-food-price crisis, both countries faced difficulties because of their lack of FR. For many 
years, Bangladesh succeeded in mitigating staple price increases only by allowing more imports. 
However, in 2008, the crisis on international markets resulted in longer and uncertain import timelines 
which seems to have provoked speculation (stock hoarding) and panic purchases, resulting in 
exacerbating the increase in the domestic rice price. The government of Bangladesh understood the 
lesson: it nearly tripled the size of its FR. Senegal’s experience has been quite similar. Since the 
liberalization of the rice sector in 1995, Senegal government has not held FR but only a financial 
reserve supposed to allow rapid purchases in case of necessity. The limitations of this scheme were 
apparent during the 2008 crisis when importers were suspected of hoarding stocks (the domestic price 
increased even after import duties have been removed). After the crisis, the need for FR was 
reaffirmed. If Bangladesh and Senegal highlighted the need for FR to manage import timelines, 
Ethiopia’s experience showed that FR alone are not enough: in 2008 (a period where imports were 
restricted), FR proved very useful in mitigating grain price increases but were not sufficient to hold 
them below their import parity price level. This illustrates the fact that the role of FR is to complement 
imports (especially during import timelines), not to replace them. FR are even more necessary when 
the staples most consumed by the poor are non-tradable, as is the case in Sahel countries: even if 
other grains can be imported (rice and wheat), they are much more expensive than local staples such 
as millet, sorghum and local maize (see the ECOWAS study). 
 
In situation of food crisis, FR can be used either to mitigate grain price increases or to supply food 
transfers to vulnerable households. An example of the first strategy is provided by the Indonesia 
success story in stabilising the domestic price of rice between 1973 and 1997. This policy was based 
on regulating imports and using FR. An example of the second strategy is given by the way FR are 
used in Sahel countries (see the ECOWAS study). Although staple prices are highly unstable in this 
region (in 2005 and 2012, the price of millet and sorghum sharply increased, generating food crises), 
FR are not used to mitigate price increases. This is because it would be too complicated to hold the 
price below a predefined ceiling. Millet and sorghum (the staples most consumed by the poor) are not 
traded on international markets and the regional market has limited stabilizing effects – mainly 
because neighbouring countries are often hit at the same time by the same natural hazards, as was 
the case in 2005 and 2012. This means that huge (and expensive) FR would be necessary to hold 
staple prices at a level compatible with food security objectives. As a result, food crises are mainly 
managed through emergency transfers. Conversely, when the considered staples can be found on 
international markets, a choice needs to be made between using FR to supply targeted transfers or to 
mitigate staple price increases. This dilemma can be illustrated by Ethiopia’s experience during the 
2008 crisis: the choice was made to supply free distributions and subsidized sales but simulations 
showed that the same effect on food and nutrition security may have been reached at a much lower 
cost if the same quantity had been sold on the domestic market. Sometimes, the two options are not 
so different, however, as FR-supplied transfers may have a very significant effect on staple prices if 
the distributed quantity is large enough.  
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Impact pathway #3 – Lessons on how FR procurement can be used to provide incentives to food 
producers 
Countries’ ability to use FR procurement to orient food production (impact pathway #3) strongly 
depends on how FR are used, especially whether they are used permanently (impact pathway #1) or 
only in periods of crisis (impact pathway #2). In the first case, regular procurement operations are 
necessary whereas in the second case occasional procurement is sufficient (usually after a crisis, 
when there is a need to replenish the FR, or when the stock should be rotated in order to avoid quality 
deterioration). In the second case, the quantity required to manage crises is higher when the FR is 
used to mitigate food price increases (impact pathway #2a) than when it is used to supply emergency 
transfers (impact pathway #2b) (Figure 1). This has strong implications on the way FR procurement 
can be used to provide incentives, as general incentives (floor prices) usually require that the quantity 
procured accounts for a significant share of the quantity traded on the domestic market, which is 
unlikely to be the case when the FR is only used to supply emergency transfers. 
 
This means that the different ways to activate impact pathway #3 (permanent or occasion incentives, 
general or targeted incentives) strongly depends on the way FR are used. The case studies illustrate 
what can be expected from four coherent combinations of FR procurement and FR uses: 
• Providing a permanent price support to farmers (coupled with permanent food transfers to poor 
households). On paper, this strategy seems coherent: a high quantity is procured every year, 
allowing the price to be maintained at a high level (with expected beneficial effects on food 
production); this quantity is distributed to poor households in order to protect them from the 
damaging effects of high food prices. However, the case studies show that, in the countries 
where this strategy has been implemented (Indonesia from 1998, the Philippines and 
Zambia), it led to very poor results. Consumers have not been really protected by the food 
transfers (in large part because of poor targeting), so that the high food prices resulted in highly 
damaging effects on food and nutrition security. Small producers benefited very little from high 
food prices. And the budgetary cost of the policy proved to be extremely high, with significant 
opportunity costs in terms of alternative policies.        
• Providing a permanent support to specific categories of farmers (coupled with permanent food 
transfers to poor households and school feeding). This situation is illustrated by Brazil’s 
experience of procuring food from small-scale family farmers through the Food Acquisition 
Programme (PAA) and the National School Feeding Plan (PNAE). These programmes not only 
target small farmers, they also incentivise them to produce organic foods and to market their 
products through farmer organizations. Although they do not really provide a premium (their 
procurement price is in line with the price prevailing on regional markets, except for organic 
products for which a higher price is offered), the mere existence of a regular structured demand 
has been sufficient to orient production and generate new marketing channels.    
• Providing price support to farmers in periods of price collapses (coupled with price mitigation in 
period of sharp price increases). This situation is illustrated by Indonesia’s successful 
experience in stabilising the domestic price of rice between 1973 and 1997. Although the floor 
price was not high (it followed the midterm trend of the international price of rice) it proved to be 
enough to boost investment in rice production.  
• Providing support to specific categories of farmers when there is a need to rebuild the FR 
(coupled with emergency transfers in period of crisis). In this situation, procurement operations 
are occasional: they are implemented after a crisis (to replenish the stock) or when it is 
necessary to rotate the stock in order to avoid quality deterioration of the food stored. ECOWAS 
countries illustrate this kind of situation. Procurements are usually made through public calls 
and the main suppliers are usually local traders. However, a percentage of the planned 
purchases is targeted on farmer organisations. The World Food Programme (WFP) may be a 
source of inspiration for governments, as it procures food not only from small farmers (through 
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its Purchase for Progress programme) but also using specific market tools such as warehouse 
receipt systems or commodity exchanges. 
 
Coordination – Lessons on the necessary coordination among FR  
The case studies provide very few lessons on how national FR can be coordinated (‘horizontal 
coordination’) to improve the stability of international markets and global food and nutrition security. 
This issue, including the role of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules, is dealt with in the second 
part of the synthesis report (European Commission 2018, chapters 6 and 7). 
 
Conversely, the case studies provide useful insights on the ‘vertical coordination’ between different 
levels of FR (local, national, regional). Local FR (called cereal banks) exist in Sahel countries; they are 
sometimes managed by municipalities (as in Mali) but most of the time by local communities. 
Interventions of national FR may destabilize local FR by offering more attractive purchasing or selling 
prices, as has been observed in Burkina Faso. Several options exist to coordinate local and national 
FR, including contracts between them. The way to coordinate different levels of FR was 
conceptualized when the ECOWAS Regional Reserve was designed. The concept (based on the 
subsidiarity principle) has been expressed through the ‘three lines of defence’ (local, national, and 
regional) that should be used successively. In line with this doctrine, the Regional Reserve is not a tool 
used by a regional authority: it is rather a regional tool that can be used by national governments when 
hit by a crisis. It therefore plays the role of a mutualized FR financed to a great extent by regional 
solidarity. The need to articulate the different scales can be extended to private stocks. The Zambia 
case study showed that, when they are managed in an unpredictable manner, FR operations are likely 
to crowd out private storage – to avoid this, FR interventions should be rules-based. Conversely, the 
Bangladesh case study suggests that, in situations of stock hoarding, FR releases can play a 
leverage effect by incentivizing traders to sell their stocks. 
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  Promoting national and household food security in Bangladesh: The 
evolving role of public stocks, cereal distribution and private trade3 
The experience of Bangladesh over the last four decades illustrates the effectiveness of a food 
security policy that combines agricultural investments, public stocks, targeted cereal distribution and a 
liberalized trade regime that promotes private sector imports. In the wake of famine conditions in 
1972-74, just after the country’s independence in December 1971, the government initially relied 
heavily on food aid to address the widespread food insecurity. Over the past five decades, however, 
the Public Foodgrain Distribution System (PFDS) has included major interventions to spur production, 
develop markets, and increase consumption of the poor that have resulted in large production 
increases, increased household food consumption and substantial price stability. 
 
Increase in foodgrain production in the 1980s and 1990s, made possible by the adoption of Green 
Revolution technology (improved seeds, fertilizer and irrigation), enabled Bangladesh to eliminate its 
‘food gap’ (the difference between net domestic production and a target level of consumption equal to 
454 grams per person per day) by 2000. Rice production more than doubled from independence 
between 1971 and 1999/2000. Most of this production increase was due to the expansion of boro 
(winter season) rice as privately owned tubewell irrigation expanded dramatically. Since 2000, 
adoption of improved varieties has led to increases in aman (monsoon season) rice production, as 
well. 
 
Source:  Author, based on Food Planning and Monitoring Unit (FPMU) data. 
Figure 2 Food aid and PFDS distribution in Bangladesh, 1976/77 – 2015/16 
 
As a result of the increase in production and the elimination of the food gap, food aid declined: from 
over one million tons per year in the late 1980s and early 1990s to approximately 600,000 tons per 
year in the early 2000s and then further to only 74 thousand tons per year in 2015/16 (Figure 2). This 
decline in food aid had major implications for the composition of grain in the PFDS. In the 1980s, 
wheat food aid accounted for about half of total foodgrain distribution, which averaged over two million 
                                                     
3  This case study summary was prepared by Paul Dorosh in August 2016. 
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tons per year. Major reforms in the early 1990s led to the elimination of major subsidized sales 
channels (Urban Rationing and Rural Rationing), the creation of the targeted Food For Education 
programme, and an overall decline in distribution to about 1.5 million tons per year throughout most of 
the 1990s. As food aid declined further in the early 2000s, the total distribution fell to about 1.3 million 
tons per year, almost all of which was sourced from domestic procurement of rice.  
 
Changes in the role of international trade also greatly enhanced food security in Bangladesh. In its first 
two decades after independence, the government maintained strict controls on international trade in 
rice and wheat. In the early 1990s, however, Bangladesh liberalised its import trade in rice and wheat. 
Thereafter, in years of relatively poor harvests in the mid- to late 1990s, import parity prices of rice 
provided a price ceiling for Bangladesh domestic market prices. Following the 1998 flood, private 
sector rice imports exceeded 200,000 tons per month for seven consecutive months, stabilizing 
domestic rice prices at import parity (based on India wholesale market prices plus transport and 
marketing costs).  
 
During the early 2000s, private traders in Bangladesh continued to import rice from India, most of 
which derived from sales of Indian government rice stocks at subsidized prices. However, in 2007/08, 
as world food prices rose, India put a temporary ban on its exports of non-basmati rice leading to a 
major price increase in Bangladesh. Ultimately, Bangladesh negotiated for a limited amount of 
commercial imports from India, but the temporary disruption of rice imports from India has led to a 
major shift in government policy with lesser reliance on international markets.  
 
Since 2008, public cereal stocks have increased, along with domestic procurement and public 
distribution (including a return to rationed sales). Total annual average PFDS stocks exceeded 1.3 
million tons in four of the last five years. Current stocks consist mainly of rice (averaging about 1.0 
million tons per year in this period). In part, this is due to the ability to better dry paddy and milled rice, 
and thereby reduce storage losses related to high moisture content that generally limited storage of 
rice to about six months.  
 
Public distribution was also scaled up after the 2007/08-price surge. Total distribution averaged only 
1.22 million tons per year (1.01 million tons of rice and 210,000 tons of wheat) from 2004/05 through 
2007/08; from 2009/10 through 2015/16, total public distribution averaged 2.065 million tons per year, 
steadily rising to a peak in 2013/14 of 2.22 million tons (1.26 million tons of rice and 958,000 tons of 
wheat). Much of this increased distribution was through sales channels, including 1.04 million tons 
through Open Market Sales (OMS) and Fair Price Cards (FP) in 2010/11 (Figure 3). Given the 
increases in both stocks and distribution, the average stocks/distribution ratio remained unchanged at 
59 per cent. 
 
Looking forward, major new planned investments in public storage facilities offer the opportunity to 
reduce storage losses and provide greater flexibility in the PFDS with regard to needs for stock 
rotation. International trade, both public and private imports, will likely continue to provide a low-cost 
option for enhancing domestic supplies in times of unforeseen shortfalls. Maintaining an appropriate 
balance between public interventions and international markets will remain a key food policy 
challenge, necessitating strong analytical capability within the Government of Bangladesh.  
 
Food security in Bangladesh has been greatly enhanced over the past two decades by policies that 
have allowed a major public foodgrain distribution to co-exist with the private sector trade. Increasing 
the efficiency of the public distribution system while maintaining incentives for private sector trade can 
help ensure that food security continues to improve in the coming decades, as well. 
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Source:  Author, based on Bangladesh’s Ministry of Food data. 
Figure 3 Public foodgrain distribution channels in Bangladesh, 2004/05 – 2015/16 
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  The formation of agricultural stocks of grains in Brazil and food 
security4 
Brazil has gone from an extreme intervention policy on food stocks and food distribution system to an 
acting-through-the-market practice in the early 1990’s. Intervention in agriculture began at the turn of 
the twentieth century and expanded with the creation of state mechanisms responsible for controlling 
production, establishing tariffs, export quotas and intervention standards through buffer stocks. Due to 
the Brazilian economic crisis in the 1980s, hyperinflation and loss of regulatory power, the State 
retracted and gradually food reserves control systems were established through market instruments. 
Currently, the Government operates four types of contracts that allow it to intervene within the market 
promoting the outflow of production between the regions of Brazil, without having to immobilise public 
funds in food stocks. 
 
Considering that Brazil is a major agricultural producer and has trade agreements with its neighbours, 
the volume of stocks held by the government has been decreasing gradually. At the same time, the 
stabilisation of food prices through market mechanisms based on auctions has not allowed the agility 
to face crises such as that of 2008, when international prices rocketed. There was an increase and 
high volatility in food prices in the domestic market which benefited very little the producers because, 
at that time, their costs also increased. The government tried to combat the rise in agricultural prices 
with exemptions and the relative appreciation of the exchange rate. 
 
Brazil has developed various social protection programmes since the 1990s, based both on in-kind 
food transfers as well as cash transfers. The results of these programmes have been very limited, 
both for their inefficiency as well as for their operational scale. Since 2003, Brazil has developed a 
massive programme of conditional cash transfers, called the Bolsa Família (Family Grant), which 
reached 13.9 million households ten years later, representing a total coverage of the estimated 
households in extreme poverty. Evaluations of international organisations show the positive effects of 
the programme in reducing extreme poverty and indicate a satisfactory operating performance in 
terms of efficiency. This programme also contributed in reducing the impact of high prices of food on 
the poorest families. 
 
After 2008, efforts to promote direct purchasing policies from family farming for use in social 
programmes, such as school feeding, were intensified. Nowadays, these programmes reach around 
US$500 million serving close to 200,000 farmers every year. As a large producer, and considering the 
magnitude of its food assistance to poor, Brazil hasn’t received strong impacts derived from the 
international food price rise. The analysis of price movements in Brazil from 2008 doesn’t reveal any 
generalized effect as a result from the increase of international food prices. 
 
Brazil was the first country in Latin America that had an integrated policy regarding price control and 
interventions in agricultural products. Launched in 1943, the policy of minimum prices and public 
regulation stocks started covering very few products but it has been widened step-by-step. The 
heyday of the public intervention happened during the 1960-70’s when the government controlled not 
only the food stocks, but also the amount and the import-export’s licenses, as well as the vegetables' 
wholesale in large cities. This model of intervention was dismantled in the 1980’s due to the 
hyperinflation and later, in the 1990’s, due to the introduction of the market's liberation policies. The 
last period, described above, could be characterized by a mix of indirect intervention through the 
market, in order to ‘keep the prices right,’ and equilibrate the food supply among regions, and punctual 
and compensative interventions to final consumers by means of cash transfers. 
 
                                                     
4  This case study summary was prepared by Walter Belik and Altivo R.A. de Almeida Cunha in June 2016. 
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Some of lessons drawn from the successful Brazilian case are as follows:   
• All solutions to fight food prices’ instability and volatility are dependent on how big the 
population’s food insecurity is and how this population is distributed in geographical terms. 
There is no one global solution; different countries with different trajectories and specific eating 
habits require distinctive policies. 
• It is strongly recommended to combine FR building with conditional cash transfers and other 
programmes from the demand side. They are not exclusive. 
• The best way to provide social protection and prevent food insecurity, in any scenario, is to give 
access to food through public and collective programmes, such as school feeding. 
• Individual or household food transfers (in-kind) should be used only in special areas, mainly in 
food emergencies. 
• Subsidies, through imports or internal prices, to sell food in accredited retailers or state owned 
retail chains, are a difficult operation that normally results in leakages and inefficiencies. 
• FR, be it physical or made of agricultural certificates of deposit and agricultural warrants 
controlled by government, should be substantial even if the country has an open and liberalized 
economy. However, these FR must be oriented to respect the following: storage facility 
locations covering hot spots; management of phytosanitary conditions; dissemination of 
transparent information; and clear rules for stock release. 
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  How to articulate local stocks and public stocks for food security in 
Burkina Faso?5 
Burkina Faso is a small land-locked country where food insecurity affects around one third of the total 
population. Despite a dynamic cereal production (around 5 million tons), which globally follows the 
demographic growth, strong regional disparities exist and only one fifth of the production is traded. 
Being part of a regional integration area, Burkina Faso strongly relies on regional markets and regional 
public policies for its food security (common agricultural policy, common external tariff, etc.). Since the 
adoption of a food regional reserve by the Economic Community of Western African States 
(ECOWAS) in 2012, public stock management by the SONAGESS (Société nationale de gestion du 
stock de sécurité alimentaire in French, the national agency responsible for the management of the 
food security stock) must be part of this regional framework. In case of food crises, proximity stocks 
(that is, those stocks based in villages and managed by producer organisations) should first be used, 
then should come national stocks, and regional food reserves should be used as last resort. 
 
The challenge now is to articulate proximity stocks with public stocks and to ensure that the latter do 
not affect the former. Indeed, public interventions from the SONAGESS are often under criticism by 
producer organizations (POs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) but there is only limited 
evidence from small-scale studies to provide with detailed information on their negative impacts. It is 
therefore crucial to analyse the nature of possible interactions between proximity stocks and public 
stocks based on available data and qualitative information. 
 
Public stocks and proximity stocks are very diverse in terms of objectives, as well as in their 
functioning. The National Food Security Stock (NFSS), implemented in 1994 and co-managed by the 
state and its development partners, is only used in case of major crises and was actually mobilised 
only once in 2012. The Intervention Stock (IS) was created in 2005 when it appeared that the NFSS 
could hardly be mobilised to address the food crisis. The IS is exclusively managed by the State and 
stock movements run all year round. The Regulation Commercial Stock (RCS) was created in 2010 
and is entirely managed by the SONAGESS in view of collecting financial resources. Each of these 
stocks offers preferential conditions to POs in the framework of public procurements – 20 per cent is 
dedicated to POs for the NFSS and the IS, and 80 per cent of direct contracts from the RCS are made 
with POs. 
 
Destocking operations consist in sales at social price in areas that are prone to risk and during specific 
periods (lean season), but the SONAGESS also managed since September 2013 witness shops that 
are open throughout the year and located over the whole national territory. The total conventional level 
of public stocks is 80,000 tons (of cereals mainly, with a small share of cowpea, potatoes and 
processed products), which represents a very small part of all traded cereals. Proximity stocks are 
also very diverse, ranging from cereal banks or food security granaries, whose aim is to allow buying 
cereals at low prices to sale them below the market price during the lean season, to collective trading 
for getting better producer prices, or to warrantage, which consists in deferring harvest’s sales to 
benefit from higher seasonal prices. 
 
Based on literature review and qualitative interviews with around twenty POs in surplus and deficit 
areas and with agents from SONAGESS, this case study reveals the complexity of interactions 
between publics and proximity stocks, which are both positive and negative: 
• Public procurements offer opportunities of secured outlets for POs: contracts with the 
SONAGESS represent secured markets and facilitate POs’ efforts to obtain credits to financial 
institutions. However, the modalities of public procurement with the SONAGESS are judged 
                                                     
5  This case study summary was prepared by Arlène Alpha and Bénédicte Pémou in August 2016. 
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less attractive than those of the Purchase for Progress (P4P) programme implemented by the 
WFP (lesser prices, longer payment periods and costs for the delivery of products). For 
instance, in 2015, the SONAGESS bought cowpea at 260 CFA francs (CFAF) per kilo while the 
WFP bought at CFAF 357 per kilo. Moreover, a number of limiting factors explain that only a 
few POs are actually in capacity to respond to the public procurements from the SONAGESS: 
weak storage capacities, and difficulties to collect the necessary volumes from PO members 
and to comply with the required volumes and delivery times. 
• When public procurements are made at farm-gate they directly compete with proximity stocks: 
in 2011/12, while the food production was in sharp fall and the food crisis was expanding, the 
SONAGESS chose to make farm-gate collecting operations at remunerative producer prices 
(CFAF 15,000 per 100-kg bag of maize against around CFAF 12,000 at market price) to supply 
deficit areas. During this operation, producers preferred to sell directly to the SONAGESS rather 
than through the POs. Afterwards, POs claimed that they were not able to respond to the 
SONAGESS calls, and the SONAGESS bought the necessary volumes from traders. Moreover, 
it has been observed that there is generally much less warrantage in periods of SONAGESS 
public storage (a 48 per cent decrease of the number of producers engaged in warrantage, and 
a 75 per cent decrease of the average quantity of agricultural products put in warrantage). 
• While it is difficult to document the impact of public storage on market prices, this is expected to 
be weak and localised given the small volumes in question: there is no monitoring and 
accounting of purchased volumes by the SONAGESS and it is therefore not possible to link the 
SONAGESS operations with market prices. However, given the small purchased volumes, 
which furthermore tend to run over the year, it is doubtful that these operations may have 
significant impact. The market surveys made by the SONAGESS show nevertheless that 
traders tend to appreciate periods of public procurements as an opportunity to sell at higher 
prices. 
• Sales at social price tend to depress market prices: public destocking in the form of sales at 
social price is generally too weak to expect a direct downward impact on market prices. 
However, POs’ testimonies and market surveys tend to show that sales during the lean season 
have an impact. Traders tend to postpone their sales when they are informed that there will be 
sales at social price because they know that they will have difficulties to sell at the price they 
want. Warrantage operations by the POs are also affected by sales at social price (a decrease 
of around 20 per cent is observed in the average producer prices). Since the opening in 
September 2013 of witness shops throughout the year, a number of POs complain about the 
decrease of producer prices. For instance, a PO specialised in rice processing usually sold a 
25-kg bag at around CFAF 10,000 but this bag is now sold at CFAF 7,500 in these witness 
shops. 
• Some opportunities of complementarity between sales at social price and proximity stocks exist: 
in deficit areas, POs were sometimes mobilised to make sales at social prices, which has been 
considered as a good operation. This is a way for these POs to make their proximity stocks 
known by dwellers in villages. 
 
Three ranges of recommendations are proposed for a better articulation between public stocks and 
proximity stocks in Burkina Faso and at the regional level: 
• A complementarity of action: it appears important i) to know better proximity stocks – a directory 
of POs which usually work with the SONAGESS is planned by the SONAGESS and a mapping 
of proximity stocks in the Sahel might be elaborated by the Permanent Interstate Committee for 
Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), ii) to improve the predictability of storage and destocking 
operations from the SONAGESS to allow POs to adapt their trading strategies, iii) to make 
targeted sales at social price preferably where there is no or few proximity stocks, and iv) to 
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strengthen the dialogue framework between the SONAGESS and POs for public procurements 
and distributions. 
• A synergy of action: this could be made through a reduction of limiting factors regarding public 
procurements (better producer prices, higher required volumes, reduction of payment periods), 
and a contractual arrangement between proximity stocks and the SONAGESS enabling to sell 
at low prices during the lean season (the difference between the social price and the cost price 
could be subsidised but this requires to control compliance with the social price). 
• A structural support to proximity stocks: such a support should focus in particular on the 
development of storage capacities, the creation of working capitals, the training of people in 
charge of management committees on quality procedures and standards for the stocks’ 
maintenance, and the structuration or network of proximity stocks. 
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  Can the ECOWAS Regional Reserve Project improve the 
management of food crises in West Africa?6 
4.1 Introduction 
The Regional Reserve (RR) project is a project developed by the ECOWAS with the aim of improving 
the management of food crises in the region by adding a (regional) ‘line of defence’ between national 
policies and international aid. As the RR project is not really born yet,7 it is difficult to draw lessons 
from its experience. However, two reasons justify reflecting on it. First, it is a very innovative tool both 
in its modalities (the RR is a regional tool at the service of national policies) and in its objective (see 
below). Second, to some extent, the RR project may be a source of inspiration for other regions of the 
world (it has been presented as a pilot experience during the G20 2011 negotiations on managing 
agricultural price instability). We will present successively its objectives, its components, its potential 
benefits and the challenges to be overcome in order to make them real. 
4.2 Objectives of the ECOWAS Regional Reserve Project 
The objectives of the ECOWAS RR project, presented in Table 1 below, are not only related to food 
security, as the project also aims to strengthen the solidarity among Member States and to increase 
the food sovereignty in the region. The RR project is backed by a doctrine based on the principle of 
subsidiarity: the idea is not to substitute to national policies, but to back them with regional tools; it is 
not to substitute to international aid, but to better manage the timelines in mobilizing it. 
 
Table 1 Objectives of ECOWAS regional reserve project 
 Political objectives Food security objectives 
Vis-à-vis national policies 
Increasing the solidarity between 
ECOWAS Member States 
Improving food security by 
complementing national policies 
and international aid in managing 
food crises Vis-à-vis international aid 
Increasing the food sovereignty of 
ECOWAS region and countries 
Source: Authors. 
 
These objectives can only be understood by tracing back how the idea of this project emerged, in the 
aftermath of the 2005 and 2008 food crises. Before 2005, in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, FR were 
limited to a small reserve co-managed with the donors. In 2005, these countries faced a major crisis 
due to the bad harvest of millet and sorghum resulting from a drought and locust attacks. After the 
2005 crisis, considering that this FR was not enough and that the procedures to mobilize it were too 
heavy, these three Sahel countries decided to build other FR directly managed by the government. 
Mali also created more than 700 decentralized FR managed by the 700 municipalities of the country. 
Some elements of the RR project rationale emerged at that time: the wish for more FR, the wish for 
more independence vis-à-vis the international community, and the subsidiarity principle. Then, came 
the 2008 crisis on international markets. For ECOWAS countries, the consequences were a sharp 
increase in the price of imported rice and increased import delays. This resulted in a strong lack of 
confidence in international markets. And here is probably the main source of the idea that some kinds 
of reserves are necessary to manage import timelines. Another consequence of the 2008 crisis is 
related to the fact that many West African countries implemented export bans with the aim of 
mitigating price increases on their domestic market. These measures were not really effective (they 
were circumnavigated most of the time), but they highlighted the lack of solidarity between ECOWAS 
countries. 
                                                     
6  This case study summary was prepared by Franck Galtier in July 2016. 
7  As of July 2016, when the case study was written. 
 17 
4.3 Components of the ECOWAS Regional Reserve Project 
The RR project encompasses two main components: increasing the level of national FR (thanks to 
regional funding) and building a regional reserve. Both components are complementary because they 
seek to help countries meet their staple needs in case of crisis. Both respect the principle of 
subsidiarity by strengthening the tools in the hands of national governments – the RR is designed to 
be used by national governments, not by ECOWAS authorities. Both involve regional solidarity but the 
RR goes further in this direction: the increase in national FR is initially funded by the region but, when 
these stocks are exhausted, they are replenished through national funds; in the case of the RR, the 
rebuilding of the stocks is also covered by the region. 
 
Planned increase in national FR and size of the RR 
The required size for national FR and the RR was determined by estimating the staple needs of each 
ECOWAS country when facing a major crisis. This has been done by: i) taking the percentage of 
population affected by the major crisis experienced by this country between 2000 and 2012; ii) 
multiplying this percentage to the estimated population for 2020; iii) applying the WFP norm of 15 kg 
needed per person per month; iv) assuming that three months of these annual needs should be met 
regionally for landlocked countries, and 1.5 months for coastal countries (in order to manage the 
timelines for mobilizing international aid). This gave the needs for staple FR, country by country. The 
next step has been determining the share of these needs that should be covered by the RR (as 
opposed to the national FR). In the name of the subsidiarity principle, it has been decided that, at the 
aggregated level of the ECOWAS region, this share will be around 33 per cent, resulting to the 
conclusion that the relevant size for the RR is around 410,000 tons and the required size of national 
FR around 840,000 tons (given their current size, the required increase in national FR is over 600,000 
tons). The last step has involved the definition of the weight of the physical and financial components 
within the RR: 140,000 tons for the physical stock, and roughly equivalent to 270,000 tons for the 
financial stock. 
 
Rules and procedures for using the RR 
Each ECOWAS Member State can ask for using the RR for free (in the name of regional solidarity) up 
to a certain amount, provided that this Member State is facing a food crisis. This amount (the country 
‘quota’) corresponds to a given share of the country needs for staple FR (estimated as described 
above). As already indicated, this share is around 33 per cent on average, but in fact it varies 
depending on whether the considered country is coastal or landlocked and whether it belongs to the 
least developed countries (LDCs) or non-LDCs (40 per cent for landlocked LDCs, 20 per cent for 
countries landlocked or LDC, and 10 per cent for coastal non-LDCs). This allowed calculating the 
quota of each country (that is, the quantity it can get for free from the RR when hit by a crisis) and the 
required level of its national public stocks – as presented in Table 2 below. 
 
Funding strategy 
The estimated cost of increasing national PS by 600,000 tons is around USD 3,000 million (the project 
plans to do this over 8 years), whereas the annual cost of the RR is around USD 200 million (if 100 
per cent of the RR are used within the year, only USD 150 million if only 75 per cent of the RR are 
used). ECOWAS asked donors for support (the European Union already provided around EUR 50 
million), but the idea is that around 75 per cent of the funding should stem from the resources of the 
region through a “Zero Hunger tax” on ECOWAS overall imports (this tax would generate around USD 
390 million per year). 
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Table 2 Calibration of the RR and estimation of the required increase in national FR 
 
* Estimate based on the WFP norm of 15 kilo per person per month. 
Source: Authors’ calculus based on ECOWAS (2012) – table 3 (p. 38) for annual needs; note 18 (p. 39) for the list of coastal countries and landlocked countries (that determines the share of the 
needs that should be met by FR: 1.5 or 3 months); note 19 (p. 40) for the lists of LDCs/non LDCs countries (that jointly with the coastal/landlocked criterion determines the percentage of 
the needs met by FR that should be covered by the RR). 
 
ECOWAS 
country
Population 
in 2020 
(000s)
Population affected 
following most serious 
crisis          
Annual estimated needs 
by 2020                                                                   
(Tons)
Import 
timelines
Country 
needs for FR 
(Tons)
% of the needs for FR 
covered by the RR
Needs covered 
by the RR                         
(Tons)
Needs covered 
by national FR                       
(Tons)
Current level of 
national FR                              
(Tons)
Required increase 
in national FR 
(Tons)
Benin 11 523 4% 82 966 1,5 months 10 371 20% 2 074 8 297 8 297
Burkina Faso 22 150 18% 717 660 3 months 179 415 40% 71 766 107 649 28 000 79 649
Cape Verde 544 7% 6 482 3 months 1 621 20% 324 1 296 1 296
Côte d’Ivoire 24 503 4% 176 422 1,5 months 22 053 10% 2 205 19 847 19 847
Gambia 2 242 36% 145 282 1,5 months 18 160 20% 3 632 14 528 14 528
Ghana 30 325 4% 218 340 1,5 months 27 293 10% 2 729 24 563 24 563
Guinea 12 765 4% 91 908 1,5 months 11 489 20% 2 298 9 191 9 191
Guinea-Bissau 1 863 8% 25 989 1,5 months 3 249 20% 650 2 599 2 599
Liberia 5 166 13% 120 884 1,5 months 15 111 20% 3 022 12 088 12 088
Mali 20 537 23% 850 232 3 months 212 558 40% 85 023 127 535 17 000 110 535
Niger 22 071 53% 2 118 286 3 months 529 572 40% 211 829 317 743 32 000 285 743
Nigeria 203 869 4% 1 467 857 1,5 months 183 482 10% 18 348 165 134 150 000 15 134
Senegal 15 998 7% 201 575 1,5 months 25 197 20% 5 039 20 158 20 158
Sierra Leone 7 178 4% 51 682 1,5 months 6 460 20% 1 292 5 168 5 168
Togo 7 343 4% 52 870 1,5 months 6 609 20% 1 322 5 287 5 287
ECOWAS 388 077 6 328 433 1 252 637 411 554 841 083 227 000 614 083
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4.4 Can the RR project increase the solidarity between ECOWAS countries? 
The answer is clearly yes, as the RR project encompasses three forms of solidarity: 
• Solidarity with countries vulnerable to food crises. The countries strongly affected by past crises 
will receive a higher support from the regional solidarity to increase the level of their PS (even 
more if they are landlocked). 
• Solidarity with countries hit by food crises. This form of solidarity is implemented through the 
‘mutualization’ of the RR: all countries contribute but only those in crisis benefit (the right to use 
the reserve is triggered by country food insecurity indicators based on the Cadre Harmonisé 
Bonifié8 (CHB). Moreover, among the countries hit, countries with higher needs benefit more: 
the quantity each country can get for free from the reserve (its quota) depends on its needs for 
staple stocks. Last but not least, for a given level of needs, the solidarity is higher for poor and 
landlocked countries, as a higher percentage of their needs is covered by the RR (Section 4.3). 
• Solidarity regarding the funding of the RR project. As the major part of the cost of the RR and 
the initial increase in national FR is supposed to be funded through a “Zero Hunger tax” on each 
ECOWAS Member State’s extra-ECOWAS total imports, non-LDC coastal countries (Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria) will be the main contributors. 
 
These three forms of solidarity would result in a very high level of regional solidarity with Sahelian 
countries (especially Niger), as these countries are the most often hit by food crises, have the higher 
needs, and are all landlocked and LDC countries: while contributing very few (around 5 per cent of the 
total cost), they will get around 90 per cent of the RR quotas and 77.5 per cent of the increase in 
national FR – as shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5. A potential additional benefit is that the existence of 
these three forms of solidarity is likely to incentivise countries to renounce implementing export bans. 
 
 
Source:  Authors, based on ECOWAS (2012) – see Table 2 for details. 
Figure 4 Regional solidarity associated to the RR 
                                                     
8  Harmonised food security indicator used in West Africa – the CHB is broadly based on the Integrated Phased Classification 
(IPC). 
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Source: Authors, based on ECOWAS (2012) – see Table 2 for details. 
Figure 5 Regional solidarity associated to the increase in national FR 
4.5 Can the RR project improve food security in the ECOWAS region? 
As the RR Project has not been implemented yet, the only thing we can do is assessing its adequacy 
with the characteristics of food crises in West Africa. In order to do that, we identified the main types of 
food crises faced by the region during the last years and we tried to imagine what might have been the 
effect of the RR project in improving the management of these crises. The main identified expected 
benefits results are as follows. 
 
Improved diagnosis and early warning by strengthening the ‘think regional’ 
The use of the Cadre Harmonisé Bonifié (CHB) to compare the situation of various countries will lead 
to take into account the regional dimension of crises – the misunderstanding of the dynamics of the 
regional market led to strongly underestimating the Niger 2005 crisis. 
 
Earlier (national and international) responses 
The most obvious effect is that, thanks to the RR and increased national FR, stronger national 
responses will be possible while mobilizing international aid. The RR project may also reduce the 
delay in mobilizing international aid, as governments are more likely to recognize the magnitude of the 
crisis if they have more means to manage it – as illustrated by past crises in the region. Finally, it can 
also reduce the delay for implementing international aid thanks to the increased availability of physical 
stocks – the lack of stocks has been, for instance, an important issue during Niger 2005 crisis.   
 
Better responses 
Acting sooner may reduce the needs for costly nutritional recovery programmes, which represented 
more than 60 per cent of the budget for managing the Niger 2010 crisis, thereby saving means for 
more medium-term action focused on household livelihoods and resilience. The availability of physical 
stocks may also allow for more use of local staples in (national and international) interventions, which, 
in turn, may contribute in reducing the cost and delays of interventions, and in mitigating the increase 
in the price of these staples, which are the most consumed by the poor. The RR project may also lead 
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to more coordination between national responses to regional crises: by increasing the means of all 
ECOWAS country governments, the RR project may lead to the simultaneous use of FR, thereby 
contributing to mitigating surges of staple prices much more effectively. 
4.6 Can the RR project increase the food sovereignty of the ECOWAS region and countries? 
In this area, the ambition of the RR project is more limited; it is not to substitute to international aid but 
only to manage the crises during the delays for mobilising international aid. Moreover, in the proposed 
funding strategy of the RR project, development partners still play a role, although the main part of the 
funding is supposed to stem from regional resources. However, by increasing the capacity of 
ECOWAS country governments, the RR project may contribute not only to an increased role of 
governments before the arrival of international aid, but also to a co-management of international aid. 
The 2005 crisis in Niger showed that international aid (channelled exclusively through the United 
Nations clusters and NGOs) can have a very destructuring effect on national institutions. Holding more 
stocks may increase the role played by the government, especially when there is a scarcity of local 
staples, as occurred in 2005. The RR project may also provide secondary benefits to food sovereignty 
by, on the one hand, promoting the use of local staples (millet, sorghum, maize, milled cassava) when 
managing food crises, thereby fitting better with consumer habits and preferences, and, on the other 
hand, strengthening procurement on the local market. 
4.7 Challenges  
Anyway, all the benefits mentioned above are only potential benefits. Making them real would require 
the involvement of the ECOWAS Commission and its Member States in the funding of the RR project. 
However, until now the only contributor to the building of the RR project is the European Union: the 
Member States did not deliver the quantity of staples they were supposed to deliver to build the RR; 
the regional economic communities (ECOWAS and the West African Economic and Monetary Union) 
did not provide the money they were supposed to provide for the building of the RR; the Zero Hunger 
tax has not been created. Another challenge is related to the lack of (proper) use of the CHB by many 
ECOWAS countries. As the CHB is the basis of the (harmonised) food insecurity indicators that will 
trigger countries’ right to use their RR quota, generalizing the use of the CHB is necessary to avoid 
conflicts. 
4.8 Conclusion 
This case study is a good illustration of the conclusion of the overall study, as reflected in its synthesis 
report9, that food reserves are particularly useful when: i) the staples most consumed by the poor are 
non-tradable; ii) the country is landlocked; and iii) the storability of the considered commodity in the 
considered country is good. It also illustrates the fact that a regional approach can be very useful in 
situations with many spillover effects between countries (including porosity of borders). Therefore, the 
relevance of the RR project is not questionable. The main challenges are related to its implementation. 
                                                     
9  European Commission (2018). 
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  Public policies for enhancing food security: The case of Ethiopia10 
Ethiopia, a country prone to prolonged droughts that can have devastating effects on cereal and 
livestock production, has made tremendous progress in enhancing food security over the past two 
decades. Massive famines occurred in the early 1970s and mid-1980s during major droughts, as 
emergency relief efforts could not compensate for the fall in domestic cereal and livestock production 
and a sharp decline in access to food for millions of households. Other factors were also important, 
however, including a long-term neglect of smallholder agriculture, inadequate infrastructure, poorly 
developed private markets (and cereal movement restrictions during the 1984 famine), and slow 
response of public institutions. 
 
Over the last decade, however, food security has been substantially enhanced, in large part due to 
public investments and policies that led to a doubling of cereal production over the past ten years, 
more efficient agricultural markets and development of a flexible and well-targeted large-scale safety 
net. Improvements in the effectiveness of food security and disaster management institutions related 
to market price stabilization, management of stocks and coordination of emergency relief have played 
a role as well. 
 
From the 1960s through the 1990s, Ethiopia’s government intervened in domestic cereal markets in 
an effort to control prices. Successive government agencies were created and subsequently 
disbanded, including the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) begun under the reign of Emperor Hailie 
Selassie in the 1950s, the Agricultural Marketing Board (AMB) created under the Derg regime in the 
mid-1970s and the Ethiopian Grain Trading Enterprise (EGTE) beginning in 1991. The government’s 
share in domestic cereal markets (EGTE and its predecessors) declined substantially over time, 
however, from its peak of around 40 per cent in the 1980s to only four per cent by the late 1990s and 
less than two per cent during the 2001-2007 period. Public commercial imports prior to 2008 were 
generally small, but since then the EGTE has imported more than a million tons of grain in years of 
major production shortfalls to stabilize prices and subsidise urban consumption. 
 
Since 1996, food aid inflows to the country have ranged from about one quarter of a million tons to 
nearly two million tons following the drought in 2003. Although food aid as a percentage of total grain 
production has been small in most years, this share rose substantially in drought years, reaching as 
high as 16 per cent in 2003. A major shift in food aid planning and distribution occurred in 2005, 
however, with the introduction of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) that replaced annual 
“emergency” appeals for food aid with targeted programmes of both food in-kind and cash transfers to 
households, linked to local public works projects and household asset building programmes. 
 
Following the drought of 1973–74 and subsequent famine, the Government of Ethiopia set up a 
strategic grain reserve, supplied both by regular inflows of food aid, as well as domestically produced 
grain. Thereafter, the Government of Ethiopia established the Ethiopian Food Security Reserve 
Agency (EFSRA) in 1982, as a unit of the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission with a mandate to 
manage the stocks. In some years, government and NGO agencies have borrowed from these stocks 
to be able to conduct emergency operations even before food aid shipments arrived. Recommended 
levels for the stock were gradually raised over time, from 204,600 metric tons in 1987 to 407,000 tons 
in 2004 (following the droughts of 2002-03. By 2009, the merits of raising the strategic grain reserves 
up to 1.5 million metric tons were being debated. 
 
Administrative reforms in the disaster risk management agency designed to enhance coordination, 
augment public ownership, and provide more rapid response to disaster risks have also proven 
effective. Nonetheless, the country still suffers from considerable price instability. By design, the food 
                                                     
10  This case study summary was prepared by Shahidur Rashid, Dawit Alemu and Paul Dorosh in August 2016. 
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stocks are too small to support large-scale market interventions needed to effectively stabilize prices. 
Moreover, interventions would be very costly due to large transport and marketing margins for cereals. 
Nonetheless, there are largely unrealized opportunities to lessen price stability and reduce costs to the 
government through encouraging private sector international trade in wheat and maize.   
 
Thus, the Ethiopian food system with its minimal stocks has successfully evolved over time. Policies 
and public investments to promote increased production, more efficient markets and effective safety 
nets have made large contributions to overall food security, while costly direct government 
interventions in markets to stabilize prices have greatly diminished since the 1990s. Public FR play 
only a minor role in the current food system, essentially functioning as working stocks that expand 
temporarily to facilitate emergency relief operations, while the institutions charged with management of 
food stocks and emergency relief have grown increasingly effective in addressing crises. Nonetheless, 
because the country remains susceptible to drought, Ethiopia will continue to need well-chosen public 
investments and well-functioning institutions to maintain or surpass the remarkable gains 
improvements in food security it has achieved over the past two decades. 
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  The role of public grain stocks in food security: Indonesia’s 
experience11 
This Indonesia case study attempted to: i) analyse food security activities within a historical context; ii) 
emphasize the broader macro context in which the issue of grain reserves is set, and iii) raise as many 
– really more – questions than to which it provides answers. It dealt with price stability, public FR, 
trade policies, and in-kind social transfers. At least historically, the Indonesian story is a series of 
emergencies. The case study did not deal with cash or voucher transfers, asset (cattle, etc.) transfers, 
production input transfers, or policies to boost private storage/warehouse receipt systems (although it 
does introduce the potential role of supermarkets), for these issues are not directly relevant to the 
Indonesian experience. 
 
Indonesia has a long history – since independence from Dutch rule in 1945, and even before – of 
using FR of rice to provide food security. Beginning in 1973, in the early days of the post-Sukarno 
period, domestic rice prices were stabilized around world rice prices. A food logistics agency, named 
BULOG, was established to control rice prices with a head who reported directly to the President and 
with a line of credit at subsidized interest rates from the Central Bank. The floor price covered costs of 
production, provided a margin to encourage adoption of new technology, and was known in advance 
of sowing – farmers could count on at least minimum prices in their decision-making.  
  
The buffer stock under BULOG control was built up when production was abundant and disbursed 
relatively evenly over years to provide wages in-kind to civil servants to offset the impact of rising 
prices (there was very rapid inflation – several hundred per cent yearly – in the 1950s and 1960s) and 
provisioning the military – two pillars in providing political stability. 
 
Rice was injected into retail markets to defend the ceiling price. Importantly, and by design, the band 
between upper and lower price bands was wide enough to encourage private trade. International trade 
provided an important balance wheel in the system: Indonesia imported to supplement domestic 
procurement when needed and exported only on occasion. Domestic prices were more stable than 
world rice prices. There were some crisis periods – the world food crisis in 1972/73, the collapse of 
commodity prices in world markets in the mid-1980s, and another crisis in 1994/95 – but this policy 
dominated over nearly three decades until the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98 – it became impossible 
to stabilize rice prices when the macro economy and exchange rate went out of control. 
 
Price stabilization was especially important in the early days because it was an essential element in 
holding the country together politically – the post-Sukarno period was very volatile. Food shortages 
could in fact lead to urban riots causing the government to fall. It may be argued that, since the 
government did not fall, price stabilization ‘worked.’  
 
Price stabilization was important because it was an essential element in the pro-poor development 
policy. It arguably ‘worked’ because Indonesia moved from a hopeless economic situation in 1966 to a 
very high growth rate, and poverty was reduced dramatically. Low and stable rice prices were a key 
component of that broader development strategy, but this strategy could only work with rapidly rising 
productivity of Indonesia’s rice farmers. 
 
There were some special circumstances. Technocrats basically set policies and were supported by 
the political structure (the President). Sound macroeconomic policy was followed. Price stabilization 
was part of an ambitious development effort with heavy emphasis on agricultural research, extension, 
irrigation, and input supply. New high-yielding technology was introduced. Rural roads expanded 
                                                     
11  This case study summary was prepared by C. Peter Timmer in June 2016. 
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significantly. Petroleum reserves were available and exploited. Foreign assistance was abundant. 
BULOG, which implemented the price stabilization effort, grew out of a structured military command 
with adequate financial resources and an excellent information network. 
 
Thus, price stabilization: 
– had a positive effect on food consumption within Indonesia, especially by stabilizing the rising 
trend in per capita rice consumption; 
– was cost-effective; and 
– had limited negative effect on other countries – although Indonesia recognized that it was a 
“large country” in the world rice market. 
 
When the Asian financial crisis hit in 1997/98, the Suharto regime collapsed, and democracy took 
hold. BULOG’s broad-based trade monopoly and price stabilization authority were dismantled. In the 
early 2000s, in what was a conscious political choice because of import restrictions, retail rice prices 
began to rise – well above world prices. For nearly two-thirds of rural households in Java, higher rice 
prices mean lower real incomes and more poverty. High prices keep inefficient farmers in rice 
production, providing disincentives for them to change to consumer-driven, high-value commodities, 
an essential transition for sustained economic growth over the longer run (and higher incomes for 
small farmers).  
 
As the offset to a political strategy of wooing the loyalty of rice farmers via high prices, the targeted 
food subsidy programme became the government’s single most important policy instrument for 
protecting food security. What eventually emerged as the Raskin (food for the poor) programme had 
the best of intentions and was well conceived, but was poorly implemented. 
 
Under democracy, a radical decentralization basically tied the hand of the central government 
agencies and opened the door to locally induced corruption that undermined Raskin. BULOG was 
reorganized into a Perum (a public corporation), rather than a government agency reporting to the 
President or the cabinet, resulting in hiding various costs in the Raskin accounts, but without any true 
public responsibility. Type-I (exclusion) and Type-II (inclusion) targeting errors grew. Costs have risen. 
Corruption is a very significant, and visible problem. Waste has mounted. There have been four 
significant evaluations from which recommendations have emerged, including: strengthen targeting; 
reduce ‘leakages’; increase transparency and accountability; strengthen oversight and monitoring, 
including ‘socialization’ (community responsibility); without significant changes in the above, return to 
price stabilization only. 
 
In conclusion, if the policy discussion is restricted solely to the future of Raskin, a sensible analyst is 
likely to agree with the widespread sentiment in Jakarta’s community “kill it off.” But a discussion about 
the broader role of food security in the development process requires a much more nuanced and 
historically informed view. Indonesia needs a new food policy. 
 
Overall, in-kind transfers: 
– had a limited, and highly questionable in statistical terms, effect on food consumption within 
Indonesia; 
– were not cost-effective; but 
– had limited negative effect on other countries. 
 
To summarize the contribution of this case study to the three major debates around the role for food 
reserves in enhancing food security in developing countries: 
• Transfer Tools Debate. While recognizing broader aims in providing transfers to poor 
households (either in a situation of crisis to allow them to maintain their food consumption level 
or in normal time with the aim of reducing chronic malnutrition), the case study only addresses 
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transferring food, which had highly mixed results. It does not address cash or food vouchers, 
except as possible alternatives to the Raskin in-kind transfer programme. There is no empirical 
experience yet. 
• Stabilization Tools Debate. If the aim is to contain grains price spikes, price stabilization (FR) 
and trade policies (policies that try to regulate imports and/or exports) can be quite effective.  
Policies that support private storage (interest rate subsidies, rent of warehouses at low prices, 
support to warehouse receipt systems, etc.) were not discussed because such storage 
subsidies would be ineffective in Indonesia. 
• Stabilization vs. Transfer Debate. In a situation of emerging food crisis, the case study does not 
address whether it is better to try to contain or mitigate price spikes or to compensate their 
effect on poor households by providing transfers. Timmer (2004) argues that mitigating price 
spikes is the only realistic strategy in Asia to protect poor rice consumers. 
 
The case study does not address whether it is better to use FR to act on prices or to provide transfers 
to targeted households – although the early Indonesian programme seemed to do both, because of 
the beras pegawi programme (rice distributed to civil servants as part of their wages), which outlived 
its economic usefulness in the 1980s. More generally, it does not address whether it is better to 
promote stabilization tools or transfer tools – although, given the historical context (which is 
significant), the study favours FR because the stability in rice prices that FR permitted generated an 
economic growth which resulted in increased income for poor households (that is, ‘transfers’ in some 
ways) and substantially reduced poverty. 
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  Efficiency of food reserves in enhancing food security in developing 
countries: The case of Nigeria12 
The food security challenge in Nigeria began before independence but intensified after independence 
as agriculture lost to oil exploration as the top foreign exchange earner. Within a few years after 
independence, the agricultural sector transited from a net foreign exchange earner to a net foreign 
exchange drain. Commencement of large-scale oil exports in early 1970s led to near abandonment of 
agriculture and disappearance of the cocoa mountains in the West, the oil palm and kernel heaps in 
the East and groundnut pyramids in the North. Food insecurity gained national attention during the 
period but the policy response was food importation rather than a return to self-sufficiency in domestic 
production. Efforts to tackle the challenge through domestic production by subsequent governments 
were ineffective and failed to achieve any tangible outcomes. 
 
Table 3 Nigeria’s agriculture and food statistics 
  1990 2000 2014 
Setting       
     Population (million)        95.6      122.9          178.5  
     Population, rural (million)           61.9            70.8            86.6  
     Urbanization (%) 35.3 42.4 51.5 
     Area harvested (million hectares)           34.0            65.0          100.0  
Hunger Dimension       
     Cereal import dependency ratio (%)             6.4            13.6            21.7  
Food Supply       
     Food production value, 2004-06 (million int. dollars)      15,138       25,335       36,075  
     Agriculture, value added (% GDP)               32                26                20  
     Food exports (million USD)            158             262          1,219  
     Food imports (million USD)            480          1,017          6,402  
Net Trade (million US$)       
     Cereals          (119)          (493)      (3,211) 
     Fruit and vegetables               (2)            (17)            159  
     Meat                -                  (1)            (11) 
     Dairy Products            (73)          (134)          (519) 
     Fish          (166)          (169)      (1,142) 
Source:  FAO Statistical Pocketbook 2015. 
 
The first national agricultural policy of 1999 placed self-sufficiency in basic food supply and attainment 
of food security as its foremost objectives, and launched a series of food security initiatives to raise 
productivity in food production through technology transfers and large-scale irrigation programmes to 
support all-year food crop farming. Successive governments built on the efforts initiated in the policy 
and, in particular, food sufficiency received a remarkable boost in support in the policies of the 
administration that began in 2011. However, in spite of the efforts and achievements, the country grew 
more dependent on food imports owing to growing population and insufficient local production, thus 
intensifying the food security challenge (Table 3). Between 1990 and 2014, local production grew by 
138 per cent while net food import grew by 1,510 per cent, net cereals import grew by 2,600 per cent, 
                                                     
12  This case study summary was prepared by Chukwuka Onyekwena in June 2016. 
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and cereal import dependency rose from 6.4 per cent in 1990 to 21.7 per cent in 2014. Yield growth in 
crop production has been lacklustre and falls substantially below global trends. Thus, international 
commodity trade is central to the country’s food security making external markets a salient component 
of food security. There is no specific policy or strategy for external sourcing of food to complement the 
reality. Instead, efforts continue to be centred on local production where self-sufficiency has been an 
elusive goal. 
 
Nigeria’s food reserve programme was launched in 1987 in response to the need for greater capacity 
to respond to food security challenges during natural disasters. The public food reserve architecture is 
a three-tier system that includes the strategic grain reserves operated by the federal government, 
which aims to hold 5 per cent of total reserves, the buffer stock programme operated at the state level 
to hold 10 per cent of public reserves, and on-farm storages at local government level expected to 
hold the remaining 85 per cent. However, this decentralized policy is neither backed by a coordinated 
strategy not supported by earmarked financial resources. The operation of food reserves also varies at 
different levels. While the federal storage programme is principally focused on response to internal 
disasters and food aid to friendly neighbouring countries facing food crises, the state buffer stock 
programmes are principally commercial programmes of buying and selling essential grains at times of 
low and high prices respectively. On-farm food storage programme operates as a hybrid of the federal 
and state programmes. 
 
The federal strategic reserve silos are empty for the most part of their existence. There is no 
programme to systematically fund the accretion of reserves against contingencies. The operational 
mode of the strategic reserves deduced from the limited data available is that grains are purchased 
when the need arises. State buffer stocks are for the most part empty. When grains are reserved, they 
are kept in warehouses where conditions prevent holding the stocks for a long period of time. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that on-farm storages are vast, but there is no systematic data available 
on this segment. Private reserves are operated as commercial activities in the large part, and are held 
by individuals (farmers, traders and middlemen, and merchants) and private companies (millers and 
manufacturing companies using grains as raw materials). It is estimated that grain merchants, traders 
and middlemen dominate private reserve holdings in the northern zones while private companies and 
marketers dominate in the southern zones. 
 
The financial requirement of building up stock is quite large, and governments are unable to allocate 
the needed funds on food storage. It is estimated that the strategic grain reserve department would 
require 110 billion Nigerian naira (NGN) to stock all the strategic reserve silos in 2014. This cost is 
monumental when compared to budget allocation of NGN 37 billion to the entire agriculture sector for 
the year. In addition to stocking costs, silos require frequent aeration and temperature checks, which 
make use of electric power challenging due to frequent power outages. Owing to the enormous 
financial requirements of stocking, managing and maintaining the silos, the federal government has 
recently begun the process of concessioning all-but-four of the federal silos to private operators. 
 
The findings suggest that public food reserves have not played a substantial role in food security in 
Nigeria, particularly in the moderation of grain prices. Although the infrastructure exists, the costs of 
using and managing reserves are enormous. There is a possibility that permanent supplies to poor 
households from public reserves exist at the subnational level, these are not widespread. Private food 
reserves are widespread but serve mostly private and commercial interests, and thus are unlikely 
suited to price moderation. 
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  Rice stocks, policies and food security in the Philippines13 
The food security programme in the Philippines is focused on rice, the country’s staple food.  
Authorities ensure that rice is available to the population at affordable and stable prices. They have 
strived to make the country fully rice self-sufficient, restricting imports to maintain a local price that 
gives farmers an income to stay in rice. To offset high prices, the programme has a rice consumption 
subsidy targeted for the poor. Seasonal rice price fluctuations are smoothened with intra-year rice 
reserves. Occasionally, they provide farm price supports in the event of a bumper rice harvest. Deficits 
in the rice sufficiency targets due to whatever reasons, most of which are related to extreme flooding, 
are met with rice imports by the government. 
8.1 The National Food Authority 
Judging from the age of the parastatal, the National Food Authority (NFA), which has run it, this 
programme is approaching half a century old. The NFA has both a regulatory and commercial 
functions, which places it with a conflict of interest. It is vested with a monopoly in rice imports, a non-
tariff measure that is temporarily allowed by the WTO until 2017. The public corporation maintains the 
public rice stocks, injects rice into the market to influence the local price, procures rice paddy from 
farmers when needed, and makes rice available for the poverty-targeted rice consumption 
programme. 
 
As the NFA is designed to buy high and sell low, it usually generates a cost for the government. At the 
turn of this millennium, the NFA had mainly sourced its buffer stock from rice imports, which are priced 
about 40 per cent lower than local prices. The margins for rice imports have thinned through the years, 
particularly because of rising logistics costs and spikes of rice price in the world market. In fact, the big 
push down to indebtedness was in 2008 when world rice prices hit the roof. The NFA imported more 
rice than the country needed at such high prices only to unload the stocks two years later at a huge 
discount because of quality problems. Its corporate debt is now approaching 250 billion Philippine 
pesos (PHP), and is almost certain to increase further if the food security program is unchanged. 
 
The factor that pushed the government to adopt this parastatal business model for food security has 
been the relative underdevelopment and lack of adequate competition in product, labour and credit 
markets in rural areas, or a lack of logistics infrastructure and lack of access of private sector to 
foreign exchange due to exchange rate restrictions. But these are problems of three or four decades 
ago as pointed out by Rashid et al. (2008). In those times, private traders had been observed in such 
markets to reduce the net earnings of rice farmers, particularly if the latter needed to sell their output 
during harvest when prices were low, or had pledged their output to creditors in exchange for credit. 
This turned out to be the quandary of the green revolution. Its success only raised the prospect of its 
lack of sustainability, when farm prices fell because of higher yields. To sustain higher productivity, the 
Philippine government had to support farm prices in order to make rice farming using higher yielding 
varieties attractive to farmers. That is not even a primary activity of the NFA now. There is also the 
concern that private traders would only charge non-competitive rice prices to consumers 
compromising food security. But that is so if the government restricts rice imports to just the NFA. 
 
A second factor includes the administrative convenience of channelling public funds into the industry. 
Thirdly, the government had enabled the NFA to regulate the industry they themselves are among the 
players, putting up discriminatory policies and spending public resources to subsidize production or 
consumption to the disadvantage of the private commercial players. 
 
                                                     
13  This case study summary was prepared by Ramon L. Clarete in June 2016. 
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The NFA’s charter has assigned multiple related tasks to the agency, and conflicts of interest 
situations (CoI) arise from the arrangement. The sharp deterioration of the NFA’s net worth and sharp 
increase of its corporate debt indicate the costs of the moral hazard problem in the role of the NFA. In 
2008 alone, the NFA incurred PHP 36 billion, and only to lose that investment two years later. The CoI 
situation is likely exploited given asymmetric information, high monitoring cost, and poor alignment of 
the personal interests of agents running the NFA with the public interest. The arrangement is there to 
exploit economies of scope. However, the CoI situations coupled with high performance 
monitoring costs of the agent makes the case against the arrangement strong. 
8.2 Rice games that NFA and private traders play 
STU ratios and prices 
The policy objective in food security is to keep rice available at the price seen to be reasonable by the 
population. Extreme price spikes as what happened in 2008 in the world market or in 1995 in the 
Philippines indicate failure. Rice stocks-to-use (STU) ratio is an important indicator of rice prices. A 
low STU ratio makes markets vulnerable to excessive price volatility even with only moderate supply 
or demand shocks, if such are accompanied with inaccurate information on the extent of the shock 
(Wright 2009). World annual rice STU ratios plummeted in the early 2000s, and just before the rice 
crisis in 2007 to 2008 were at their lowest level, 18 per cent (Figure 6). In 1995, the Philippines had an 
extreme spike of rice prices.14 Before that happened, the STU ratios in the Philippines fell during the 
first half of the 1990s. Even though the 2008 rice crisis was global, the Philippine rice STU ratio had 
likewise been falling in the first half of the 2000s. There was another episode of declining STU ratio in 
the first half of this decade and, surely enough, rice prices in the Philippines went up. After the price 
spike, the STU ratios tend to rise. 
 
 
Note: RMR = Regular milled rice. 
Source:  Philippine Statistics Authority. 
Figure 6 Philippine stocks-to-use ratio, 1990 – 2014. 
 
                                                     
14  Not only were prices high, the supply was low as well. The poor had to queue at NFA warehouses or distribution outlets to 
get rice. 
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Who holds the stocks 
Three institutions hold rice stocks in the Philippines and they have varying objectives in doing so: 
households, private rice traders, and the NFA. Households hold because they are less confident of 
rice markets or transactions cost is high in buying rice from them. Private traders maintain reserves 
because they can earn profits from storing at a time when the country has a rice surplus and selling 
them during lean period, which is in the third quarter of the year. The NFA is mandated to hold stocks 
to keep prices at affordable levels and stable. The interaction of the three is an important determinant 
of local rice formation. 
 
Households hold nearly half of the country's average monthly rice stocks in a year from 1980 to 2015. 
The public sector came second, with a share of 28.47 per cent, and last is the private trading sector, 
with 22.79 per cent. These are some of the variations. In the 1980s, the decennial average share of 
the mean monthly stocks households hold was 54.07 per cent of the total. The share came down to 
40.50 per cent in the period from 2010 to 2015, which may reflect the drawdown of rice stocks in the 
first half of the 1990s just before the 1995, and in the years in 2000s just before the 2008 rice crisis. 
 
So households contribute to the decline of STU ratios just before the price crisis. This may be 
explained by the following: i) households have greater confidence in markets, reducing their 
speculative stocks; ii) their demands for rice increase, perhaps due to higher per capita incomes; or iii) 
there is less rice that they can buy because of reduced supply. 
 
The interesting game to watch is between the private traders and the NFA as both have varying 
objectives. The former wants rice prices high, and the latter low. If this is during harvest, the former 
wants rice paddy prices low, while the NFA wants them high. Their strategies are the injections of rice 
in the market, or the in the case of rice paddy the quantity they purchase. 
 
Let’s take one case, the 1995 rice price crisis. So STU ratios declined in the first half of the 1990s. 
Private commercial stocks increased from a share of 17.61 per cent in the 1980s to 27.72 per cent in 
the 1990s. The NFA stocks on the other hand fell: from 28.33 to 24.57 per cent. If one can see stocks 
as ammunition to attain one’s objective, the private traders did rake it in in 1995. Rice prices went up. 
The severity of that was accentuated with a major mistake of the NFA and the Department of 
Agriculture. They thought the country’s rice harvest was higher than what turned out, and they learned 
of their mistake when there was no more time for the NFA to import rice. 
 
Then there was the 2008 rice crisis. This time the public reserves were high, in fact too high. And 
accordingly, local rice prices were stable and affordable. The lesson here is that who holds more of 
the stocks is likely to attain its policy objective. 
 
But there is one point that needs appreciation. These games between the NFA and the private traders 
are not going to happen if rice trade is liberalized. In effect, the government is shooting itself in the 
foot by making its work of securing food security harder by restricting rice imports. 
8.3 Leakages in Rice Consumption Subsidies 
Jah and Mehta (2009) provided interesting insights into the operations of the NFA rice subsidy 
programme. First, only about 16 per cent of the population had availed of the programme, and they 
attributed this performance to high participation costs. Secondly, only about 25 per cent of the poor 
have availed of the NFA rice subsidies, while nearly half of those who were able to purchase NFA at 
its official prices are non-poor. The programme leakage is higher in urban than in rural areas. Thirdly, 
for every dollar that NFA provides as rice consumption subsidy, it spent 2.21 dollars assuming there is 
no leakage of benefits of the programme in 2008 (Table 4). While Jah and Mehta (2009) cushioned 
this finding as consistent with what is observed in other countries (citing UN-ESCAP 2000), the 
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concern is that programmes such as that by the NFA has been very costly for the Philippines. Jah and 
Mehta estimated that the operational cost of the NFA rice subsidy programme (that is, price 
stabilization and targeted rice distribution programmes) is 2.5 per cent of the Philippines gross 
domestic product (GDP). 
 
Table 4 Philippine price subsidy: cost-benefit calculations 
Measure Unit 2006 2007 2008 
Effective NFA programme cost billion pesos  16.4 18.6 68.6 
Maintenance and other operating expenses billion pesos  6.4 1.6 4.2 
Less: Net Profit (loss) from sales billion pesos  -10.0 -17.0 -64.4 
Consumer price subsidy = retail price of 
rice – NFA rice retail price 
pesos per kilo  5.6 6.5 12.4 
Imputed volume of NFA sales  million metric tons 1.6 1.9 2.5 
Total consumer subsidy billion pesos  8.7 12.4 31.0 
Cost-benefit ratio = NFA cost/consumer subsidy  1.89 1.50 2.21 
Cost-benefit ratio, assuming 50% leakage 3.77 3.01 4.42 
Note: Data used for NFA sales covers other products than rice; however, because the NFA sales are mainly made of rice, it 
provides a close approximation of the rice subsidy cost. 
Source:  Jha and Mehta (2009). 
 
Using survey data, the World Bank (2001) in its review of the “Filipino Report Card on Pro-Poor 
Services” had similarly observed these results. Only 15 per cent of the respondents reported they had 
bought NFA rice. The rice bought tended to both of low cost and low quality. Proportionally, more poor 
people availed of this rice compared to upper income classes. However, their absolute number was 
almost the same as the non-poor who also reported they purchased NFA rice. These findings ought to 
be important pieces of advice to the government of President Duterte in the Philippines. Reportedly 
since this is not adopted yet, the government will give a sack of rice to all the poor in the Philippines 
on a regular basis, at least four million of them. This is a gargantuan task, which will just make this 
otherwise well-intentioned programme vulnerable to leakages. The country is better off giving 
money to the poor through its conditional cash transfer programme, and letting the poor 
decide where they buy the rice. 
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  The role of food reserves in enhancing food security: The experience 
of Senegal15 
Senegal belongs to the Sahel zone and, as such, is prone to recurrent climatic challenges, structural 
deficits in food production and price volatility. The country’s food situation has deteriorated steadily 
since the 1970s and this trend has been hard to reverse due to urbanisation, high population growth 
that affects cereal consumption in a context of insufficient increase in cereal production. The result is 
serious food dependence, permanent food insecurity, and frequent food crises for the most vulnerable 
groups. Despite efforts made over the years to ensure food self-sufficiency, Senegal remains a food-
deficit country. The coverage rate of its cereal needs through domestic production has varied between 
30 and 65 per cent over the past 10 years.  
 
Due to this persistent cereal deficit, the constitution of food stocks has always been translated through 
various policies initiated by the Senegalese authorities albeit with different goals and ways. Prior to the 
liberalisation policies of the late 1980s, the marketing of locally produced and imported cereals 
followed strong state regulations, involving mostly public and parastatal organisations. The 
government also required the parastatal agency for price stabilisation (Caisse de péréquation et de 
stabilisation des prix, or CPSP) to dispose at any time a rice buffer stock that amounts at least to two 
months of national consumption. Likewise, because cereal production fluctuates considerably and 
causes significant fluctuations in grain prices, the government put forward the food security 
commissariat (Commissariat à la sécurité alimentaire, or CSA) to stabilize prices of these cereal 
products (millet, maize, paddy rice). CSA interventions for price stabilization and producer access to 
markets were not very effective. Reducing price variability in the local cereal subsector has been an 
elusive catch. As a result, the government decided to end the experience in 1988 and to refrain from 
price stabilisation policies of millet and maize. 
 
The high costs of managing this food security system and the policy environment of structural 
adjustment of the 1980s and 1990s encouraged Senegalese authorities to end the use of food 
reserves despite the context of food insecurity and recurrent shocks. In fact, significant changes 
occurred in the late 1990s with the creation of the National Food Security Council (Conseil national à 
la sécurité alimentaire, or CNSA) in 1998 and the development of a food security strategy in 1999. 
This marks a turning point because the strategy indicates clearly that the maintenance of food security 
stocks is not necessary insofar as Senegal is a coastal country and can deal in a relatively short time 
to stock up. The process of liberalisation of the rice sector, which began in 1995, culminated with a 
devolution of the monopoly on imports and distribution of broken rice to the private sector. Likewise, 
and as a support to the process, a rice market management and monitoring unit (Cellule de gestion et 
de surveillance des marchés du riz) was created along with a market regulatory agency (Agence de 
regulation des marchés, or ARM). Furthermore, by Ministerial order, a market information system for 
rice was established. This institutional environment has contributed to preventing the establishment 
and maintenance of a food reserve, considered too expensive by the government of Senegal. 
 
With the change of political regime in 2000, policymakers decided the replenishment of the food 
security stocks for use in case of food crises (during the lean season) and/or unexpected shocks. In 
reality there is no stock on site but a budgetary provision called replenishment of food security stock (a 
budget line). In principle, the CSA uses the funds provided following specific procedures. 
Procurements are made by tender procedure following which two suppliers are retained for two years. 
Goods are bought and direct redistribution is made immediately and with fast rotation. So there is no 
palpable physical stock. Although the CSA has 71 stores spread all over the country with a total 
capacity of 87,340 tons, these are not used for long to medium term storage. When needed, the CSA 
                                                     
15  This case study summary was prepared by Ibrahima Hathie in July 2016. 
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had the capacity and the knowledge to handle the necessary volumes. The distribution is made to 
people who cannot make ends meet during the lean season and to religious leaders who organize 
religious ceremonies. The funds allocated to this budget line are generally limited. The distribution 
rules of the available goods are unclear, and political interferences are numerous. A recent audit noted 
the lack of a manual of procedures. Religious ceremonies use most of the provisions – there are about 
735 religious events during which the CSA is requested to provide rice support. 
 
Supply is made with rice. The government encourages the use of locally produced rice, but suppliers 
usually complain about logistical constraints due to dispersed production and high costs for its 
aggregation. According to the CSA, suppliers have tried to stock up at the Senegal River valley (the 
main rice basket) in 2015 but they encountered several difficulties: rice availability (that is, problems to 
gather large volumes in a short time span), quality from small-scale processors, and high prices 
offered by modern processing plants that cannot match the prices offered by suppliers in their 
responses to the tender (based on import prices). Due to the procurement procedures, a restricted 
tender cannot be made on local rice only. 
 
According to a high-level official, food crisis is not budgeted. Because of the lack of food security 
stocks, when a shock occurs, government officials tend to take two complementary actions: they 
resort to development partners; and they also print guaranteed letters that allow suppliers to commit 
and get resources from a bank. In 2013, for instance, the government emitted a special guarantee of 
FCAF 5 billion of which 2.6 billion were spent. In 2015, the government was able to fund its 
intervention through the African Risk Capacity (ARC) funds. ARC funding allowed covering much of 
the operations with FCAF 5.6 billion for food security and 3.2 billion for safeguarding livestock (cattle 
feed). 
 
The global food price crisis of 2007/08 highlighted the vulnerability of Senegal over the volatility of the 
international price of rice. By September 2007, facing soaring prices including energy, the government 
decided to suspend customs duties of 10 per cent applied to rice. Rice imports have been exempt 
from value-added tax for several years. The suspension of duties boosted imports, which reached 
exceptional levels in 2007 well above the national needs without the desired (expected) effect on 
lower consumer prices. 
 
From April 2008, confronted by the severity of the problem, the government took several measures 
including: i) limiting margins of the various market intermediaries; ii) supporting the purchasing power 
of end consumers by a grant of FCAF 5.1 billion between May and July 2008; iii) establishing 
reference stores to improve access to basic products at moderate prices; and iv) launching the rice 
self-sufficiency programme. This measure was very expensive and its implementation has led to 
supply rationing. 
 
From July 2008, coping with the budgetary difficulties and the limited impact of the measures taken so 
far, the government stopped subsidies and took drastic control measures. Authorities put in place the 
following measures: i) a toll-free number by the Internal Trade Department, prompting consumers to 
report traders who participate in the rationing of supply and upward price speculations; ii) an 
operational security plan of the territory against illegal trade practices (re-exports, arbitrations through 
outgoing products to neighbouring countries); and Iii) a control committee against food retention with a 
focus on a control of distribution channels by state services. At the same time, the government 
supported few importers to conduct special operations to supply the local market in rice. 
 
Alongside these unilateral administrative measures, the government negotiated with importers who 
accepted to incur part of the price increase from the international market, with a limited transmission to 
domestic prices. Authorities promised to pay the shortfall once the situation has stabilised and the 
fiscal situation would be less tense. This agreement lasted only a few months due to the persistence 
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of the crisis and the heavy financial burden for importers. The breakdown of the deal resulted in a 
greater transmission of the international price changes on the domestic market prices. 
 
Senegal’s current food security strategy recognises the importance of the reconstruction of emergency 
food stocks even though the modalities for constituting these FR are still not clearly specified. The 
principle of having a mixed strategy involving, on the one hand, a small food reserve and, on the other 
hand, the availability of financial resources that could be mobilised when needed, seems widely 
shared. However, the practical arrangements are not yet specified. Of prime importance is the need 
for predictability of financial resources and food to deal with emergencies. 
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  The role of strategic food reserves in enhancing food security in 
developing countries: The case of Zambia16 
Zambia’s experience in attempting to stabilise food prices through managing strategic reserves, 
pricing, and marketing and trade policy instruments has achieved mixed results, greatly influenced by 
the political economy in the country. 
10.1 Lessons learnt 
There is no question that Zambia requires a well-managed strategic grain reserve to stabilise staple 
food prices for the benefit of both consumers and producers. However, throughout the case study, it 
was apparent that there are no clear established modalities on how purchases or releases on the 
market are triggered by the agency responsible for managing the stocks. Instead, there is a desire by 
some policymakers for the government to be the biggest market player with no clear mandate. The 
failure to have clearly established price stabilisation policy causes panic and knee-jerk policies with 
few winners and many losers. Below are some key lessons learnt that came out of this case study:  
• Maize remains an important staple food crop for poor households. Short-term price spikes 
arising from poor implementation of government policy have severe consumption and food 
security consequences among the poor households, who government aims to protect in the first 
instance. 
• Staple food price stabilising policies tend to be implemented in ad-hoc, stop-and-go, and 
unpredictable ways that generate uncertainty for participants in the maize marketing system and 
create unintended consequences for the performance of food markets. Government officials 
involved in these policy measures do not realise these policies as ad-hoc; after all, they respond 
to perceived needs to influence the market to protect consumers and/or farmers. 
• Increase market participation of the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) has resulted into raising 
maize prices above the market. However, this market intervention has been regressive as it 
disproportionately benefits the relatively better-off households while having negative effects on 
extremely poor households who spend close to half their food budget expenditures on staples. 
• Unpredictable implementation of government interventions in maize market has led to reduce 
private sector participation. This has reinforced government’s perception that markets do not 
function effectively, hence the call for continued and even more proactive government 
involvement in maize marketing. 
• Informal grain markets tend to become very thin in the hunger season (November through 
March) after the majority of smallholders’ surplus production has been bought up and fed into 
formal marketing channels. Once in the hands of formal sector marketing agents, grain rarely 
gets back into informal channels. 
• Government consumer subsidy through selling subsidised maize to millers is very ineffective 
and does not lower retail mealie meal prices. 
10.2 Policy Recommendations 
Zambia has great potential of becoming a regional breadbasket but to achieve this status, there is 
need to address some fundamental policy challenges facing the staple food market. Several policy 
actions offer potential win-win options for balancing the food price dilemma. These policy options and 
recommendations are discussed below. 
                                                     
16  This case study summary was prepared by Anthony Chapoto in June 2016. 
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Fostering Private Sector Market Development 
As an initial step towards having an effective stabilisation policy, the government should review the 
country’s strategic grain reserve requirement and procurement modalities, and put in place clear 
trigger mechanisms for FRA grain purchases and releases. In particular, to be sustainable, the 
government should provide clarity on the role and operational modalities of the FRA in the maize 
market in order to stimulating more private sector involvement in the sector. 
 
To allay the concerns of the private sector about FRA’s involvement into the future, the government 
should revert to the original FRA mandate as set in the 1996 FRA act of maintaining strategic grain 
reserves for the country and confining the agency’s procurement activities in outlying areas of the 
country where the private sector finds it difficult to operate. The infrastructure to procure and import 
grain has improved over the years; there is need for the FRA to explore cheaper alternatives 
compared to physically holding all strategic reserves for at least eight months. 
 
Substitution Among Food Staples 
Consumption diversification provides a key to helping vulnerable households’ deal with food price 
shocks. Nevertheless, the agriculture policy in Zambia remains maize centric ignoring the fact that 
poor households would be served best if production and consumption of a wide range of foods is 
promoted. Although, maize remains a popular staple among the poor and vulnerable households, they 
also consume a wide range of food staples including sorghum, millet, cassava and sweet potatoes.  
These crops are drought tolerant and could be deliberately promoted as substitutes for maize.   
Unfortunately, these foods have often not featured in the discussions of food security. Dorosh et al. 
(2007) reported that neglecting the substitution effects of these substitutes leads to government and 
food aid agencies to overstate emergency food requirements. 
 
Hastening the Operation of Zambia Commodity Exchange  
Zambia has made tremendous steps towards having a private sector-led commodity exchange by 
passing the Credits Act of 2010 and putting in place a statutory instrument empowering the Zambian 
Commodity Exchange (ZAMACE) to oversee the setting-up of the warehouse receipt system. With 
ZAMACE linked to the Johannesburg Stock Exchange/South Africa Futures Exchange (JSE/SAFEX), 
the market opportunities for Zambia’s grain commodities is huge. However, in order to sustain a local 
commodity exchange, there is a need to have big traded volumes. Given that FRA is one of the 
biggest market players, the government could make a deliberate decision to help capitalise ZAMACE 
by purchasing strategic grain reserve requirements through the exchange and have the grains 
secured in certified private silos/warehouses. The government could be issued with warehouse 
receipts specifying quantity, quality and location, and these receipts could be traded on the exchange 
if need be. This could be a sure way of ensuring high volumes required to make the ZAMACE 
sustainable. Also, the cost of running the current strategic reserve system could be reduced; savings 
could be used to upgrade the silo infrastructure in the country or for other social welfare programmes.  
The government could then give long-term lease agreement to the highest bidders as long as these 
structures are used as certified grain storage for the benefits of farmers and traders. 
 
Making Maize Available in Informal market  
In deficit years, the government should reconsider its strategy of releasing large quantities of 
subsidised maize through large-scale millers alone. It would be prudent to release some of these 
stocks to the smaller local traders in provincial and district markets, small-scale millers and hammer 
mills and even small direct sales to consumers. The option of disposing grain to the informal markets 
would relieve some of the food price pressure on low-income consumers. The private sector would be 
responsible for the buying, transportation and storage activities at a fraction of the current costs 
incurred by FRA. The savings could be redirected to other unfunded public investments.   
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Moderating Price Volatility Through Trade 
Last but not least, fostering a sustainable open border policy offers Zambia a financially inexpensive 
means of reducing the domestic price volatility of staple foods. Assuming that private traders have no 
restrictions to import or export maize when market conditions permit, then the import parity price would 
become the upper price bound, while export parity sets a floor below which prices will not fall. If this is 
allowed to work without frequent government interventions, people will begin to appreciate the 
important role that trade can play in stabilizing staple food prices. Ad-hoc export or import bans in a 
small market, such as Zambia, results in significant price volatility. Eliminating uncertainties over 
government interventions – especially FRA trade volumes, and import and export regulations – would 
attract more investment into the maize sector value chain, including production, transportation, storage and 
processing. If the process is transparently managed, it will bring about price stability, which would benefit both 
consumers and producers at very low cost to the treasury. 
 
 39 
References 
Dorosh, P. A., Dradri, S. and Haggblade, S. (2007) Alternative Instruments for ensuring Food Security and Price 
Stability in Zambia. FSRP Working Paper No. 29. Lusaka: Food Security Research Project. 
European Commission (2018) Using food reserves to enhance food and nutrition security in developing countries. 
Synthesis Report. Brussels: Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development. 
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) (2006) Food Security. Policy brief, June. 
Jha, S. and Aashish Mehta, A. (2009) Effectiveness of Public Spending:  the Case of Rice Subsidies in the 
Philippines. ADB Economic Working Paper Series No. 138. 
Rashid, S., Gulati, A. and Cummings Jr., R. (eds.) (2008) From Parastatals to Private Trade: Lessons from Asian 
Agriculture. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Timmer, C. P. (2004) “The Road to Pro-Poor Growth:  The Indonesian Experience in Regional Perspective.”  
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. vol. 40, no. 2, (August), pp. 177-207.  
World Bank (1986) Poverty and Hunger: Issues and Options for Food Security in Developing Countries. 
Washington DC. 
World Bank (2001) Philippines: Filipino Report Card on Pro-Poor Services. Report No. 22181-PH, Washington 
DC. 
Wright, B. (2009) International Grain Reserves and Other Instruments to Address Volatility in Grain Markets. 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5028. Washington DC. 
 
